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cedure, however, an authoritative appellate decision to this effect is
necessary.
NEW YORK CITY CIVIL COURT AcT

CCA § 1804: "Substantial justice" in small-claims case.
CCA section 1804 directs the court to
[c]onduct hearings upon small claims in such manner as to do
substantial justice between the parties according to rules of substantive law and shall not be bound by statutory provisions or
rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence....241

Bierman v. City of New York 242 demonstrates the usefulness and
practicality of this section. The plaintiff's basement had been damaged
when a water main ruptured in front of her home. She filed a claim
for the property damage against the city who denied any liability for
the damage. Moreover, the city informed her that since Consolidated
Edison had been working on the main her claim should properly be
brought against them. Plaintiff thereupon sued both the city and
Consolidated Edison for $300, the maximum judgment obtainable in
a small-claims action.2 43 Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's case, both
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground she had
failed to produce any evidence of negligence.
Judge Younger, referring to the previously mentioned section
1804, indicated that small-claims proceedings were intended to accomplish substantial justice between the parties according to the rules
of substantive law. However, he expressed the view that in small-claims
cases the greater emphasis must be placed upon an effort to do substantial justice as opposed to an attempt to comply with substantive
law. It would not be economically feasible for one in the plaintiff's
position to bear the burden of proving negligence on the defendants'
part in an action seeking so small a judgment. Accordingly, Judge
Younger concluded that the plaintiff need not shoulder that burden;
substantial justice here required application of a rule of strict liability.
The result in small-claims cases such as Bierman is fair and equitable. The defendants, by virtue of their control, have the knowledge
and ability to safeguard against occurrences of this nature. If that is
impossible they may recoup any losses incurred in the manner suggested
§ 1804.
242 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
243 CCA § 1801.
241 CCA
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by the court: "Let them charge each person something so that no
244
person pays everything."
UNIRmom DIsTucT COURT Acr

UDCA article 2: District court has power to adjudicate title questions
for limited purposes.
In O'Friasv. Melton,2 45 the Second Department recently held that
a judgment on a question of title in a summary proceeding lacks res
judicata effect in a subsequent action brought to determine title in a
different court. The decision as to the district court's lack of jurisdiction was based entirely upon article 2 of the UDCA. However, although
the appellate division denied res judicata effect to the judgment, it
nonetheless sanctioned the district court's determination of title questions in summary proceedings for the limited purpose of settling
disputes raised in the particular proceeding. This is analogous to a
court's award of temporary alimony; the matrimonial trial court is not
bound by a prior decree for temporary alimony. 246 Both types of
"temporary" determinations are obviously creatures of practicality.
The O'Frias court did, however, find the district court's judgment had res judicata effect for quite a different reason. The parties
had incorporated in the judgment a stipulation relating to title. Had
the plaintiffs complied with the stipulation, they would have obtained
title to the property in question. But, having failed to do so, the
court held that their default precluded their bringing this action. This
holding is somewhat questionable because it seemingly permits the
parties to give the district court the requisite subject matter jurisdiction
247
which it otherwise lacks.
As recognized by the court, there existed still another basis for dismissing the complaint. After the summary proceeding, but prior to
this action, plaintiffs' action for specific performance was dismissed.
This dismissal was unquestionably res judicata since it was a determination on the merits. Therefore, this more logical and less radical
basis for the Second Department's holding supports the decision.
The decision is welcomed. A practitioner in summary proceedings
should no longer encounter delays occasioned by stays which were
necessary while a higher court determined the issue of title. Hence,
244 60 Misc. 2d at 499, 302 N.YS.2d at 698.
245 52 App. Div. 2d 1046, 303 N.Y.S.2d 785 (2d Dep't 1969).
246 7B M cKINNEY'S UDCA § 204, supp. commentary 14, 15 (1968).
247 See UDCA §§ 201, et seq.

